


# QUANTUM AUTHENTICATION AND COMMUNICATION

*PEPIJN PINKSE*

Symposium Quantum Technology 13 May 2024

UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE. | MESA+ INSTITUTE



# OUTLINE

Quantum Authentication

Quantum Communication

Secure Quantum Information Processing

Two ways to secure access:

1) Code keys



Risc of leaking out

2) Physical keys



Risc of copying



# Physical Unclonable Functions

## Properties of PUFs

- 1) Easy to evaluate
- 2) Unclonable: manufacturing has uncontrollable aspects
- 3) Quantum Readout\* → Properties can be made public; it can still not be copied!

\*proposed by Boris Skoric

# Example: SRAM Fingerprint




Weakness: emulation


Holcomb *et al.*, IEEE Trans. Comp. 57 (2008)

# Speckle Authentication

Pigment  
powder




An (impossible to  
predict)  
speckle pattern




# Speckle Authentication

Pigment  
powder




Yet another  
impossible to predict  
speckle pattern




# Emulation Risc


Pigment  
powder



A digitally generated copy  
of the expected speckle  
pattern



# *Speckle Authentication with little Light*




A small number of photons yields only little information about an illumination pattern

Yet every photon is spatially distributed in the same illumination pattern


# Wave-Particle Duality

Young's double slit experiment



Quantum mechanics:  
Light is particle AND wave

# Reverse Projection




# Quantum-Secure Authentication


Hopeless  
attacker



Single Photons



Random  
pattern



# Quantum-Secure Authentication




<https://vimeo.com/145129613>

Goorden *et al.*, *Quantum-Secure Authentication*, *Optica* **1**, 421 (2014)

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
# Quantum Readout of hardware keys (PUFs)



# Quantum-Secure Authentication



Temperature - insensitive materials



Mounting solution



Proof-of-principle demonstration




Applications?

Goorden *et al.*, *Optica* **1**, 421 (2014); <https://vimeo.com/145129613>


# Remote Key Readout

Pulse shaping to temporally focus through a medium that distorts temporal wavefronts.



# Spatial-Temporal Quantum Authentication


- PUF with two outputs: binary communication.
- Only PUF owner can decipher communication.
- Eavesdropping not possible with weak light





# Physical-Key-based Quantum Authentication

The ring resonators are designed with different sizes





→ Rings all have different sets of resonant frequencies





(unpublished)



# Temporal PUFs



*New Chip - PUF designs targeted to give more complexity using a smaller footprint*

# Integrated Pulse Shaper Design

Standard bench top configuration:



# OUTLINE

Quantum Authentication

Quantum Communication

Secure Quantum Information Processing

# Quantum Communication

Motivation: A sufficiently powerful quantum computer can break most standard asymmetric key systems (via Shor algorithm that can efficiently find prime factors on a Quantum Computer)



Post-Quantum Crypto  
(TRL 5 now)

Issues:

- Not provable secure
- Prone to backdoors
- Computational overhead
- Key size



Basis principle: No-cloning theorem

Quantum Communication

-> Quantum Key Distribution (TRL 5 in 2024)

Issues:

- Only key exchange
- Authenticated channels needed
- New infrastructure (dark fibers)
- Scalability and resilience
- Prone to implementation attacks

Measurement-Device-independent Quantum Communication needs quantum internet

# Post Quantum Crypto

## Lattice-based cryptography (e.g. Dilithium, Kyber)



Efficient, public key,  
digital signatures



Large keys needed

## Multivariate cryptography (e.g. SPHINCS+, XMSS, LMS)



Multipurpose, very  
efficient for signatures



Most public-key schemes broken

## Hash-based cryptography (e.g. Rainbow)



Very efficient, based on  
hash-functions



No encryption schemes

## Code-based cryptography (e.g. McEliece, Bike)



Fast, multipurpose



Large keys needed

## Isogeny-based cryptography (e.g. SIKE)



Elliptic-based, smallest key sizes



Low efficiency

## Symmetric-key quantum resistance (e.g. AES, SNOW 3G)



Already widespread  
use



Bigger keys needed


## NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Candidate Cracked Posted January 24 2023

Belgian researchers have cracked the SIKE cryptographic algorithm, a fourth and final-round candidate that the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) was evaluating for its Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standard.

Wouter Castryck and Thomas Decru, research experts at the KU Leuven research university in Leuven, Belgium, broke the SIKE algorithm in about 62 minutes. They did it using a single core on a six-core Intel Xeon CPU E5-2630v2 at 2.60GHz.

- PQC is important but has its limitations
- Quantum Communication offers a solution!

# Quantum Key Distribution



After Bennett & Brassard, 1984

1. Alice sends bits according to table, randomly switching basis
2. Bob measures clicks in D1 or D2 choosing a random basis
3. Bob tells Alice his choice of basis (w/o giving the result) over a public channel
4. Alice compares these choices and tells Bob which ones to discard
5. Bob transmits over a public channel a subset of his bits. Alice compares them with her own and performs error analysis
6. If error < 25% then there was no eavesdropper, Bob can use the key.

# State of the Art Fiber-Based ~~Experiments~~ Products




And many more (>10)




# Quantum Key Distribution

Problem:  
exponential  
transmission with  
distance  
How do you  
compensate for  
losses?



## Quantum Key Distribution: in space



Liao *et al.*, Nature 549, 43 (2017)

## Long-Distance Quantum Key Distribution

Simplest solution:  
'trusted nodes'

Classically store +  
repeat the message


### Quantum Backbone

- ❑ Total Length 2000 km
- ❑ 2013.6-2016.12
- ❑ 32 trustable relay nodes
- ❑ 31 fiber links
- ❑ Metropolitan networks
- ❑ Existing: Hefei, Jinan
- ❑ New: Beijing, Shanghai
- ❑ Customer: China Industrial & Commercial Bank; Xinhua
- ❑ News Agency; CBRC



# The Twente-Münster high-speed Quantum Key Distribution link

Carsten Schuck  
(WWU)  
Pepijn Pinkse  
(UT-MESA+)




# The Challenge

- Provably secure
- Commercial potential
- Slow
- Limited in Range

**UT-WWU Collaboration grant 2022**


Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM)

Superconducting Single-photon detectors (SNSPD)



# The Twente-Münster high-speed Quantum Key Distribution link

Wavelength Division  
Multiplexing (WDM)



Superconducting Single-  
photon detectors (SNSPD)

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OF TWENTE.**

- Quantum Communication Testbed
- Integrated Photonics Ecosystem




**UT-WWU Collaboration grant 2022**

**UNIVERSITY  
OF TWENTE. | MESA+  
INSTITUTE**

Drienerlolaan 5

# UT-Saxion QKD link?

M. H. Tromplaan 28



# OUTLINE

Quantum Authentication


Quantum Communication

Secure Quantum Information Processing



# Integrated Quantum Photonics

Single-photon  
Sources

Single-photon  
Detectors





# Our photonic quantum computer lab



# Optical Quantum Computing

A programmable multi-channel low-loss interferometer!

1. Quantum photo-thermodynamics (Nature Commun. 2023)
2. Entanglement witness (2112.00067)
3. Analog simulation of classical scattering (2110.04380)
4. Loop quantum gravity on a photonic chip. NPJ Q. Inf. (2023)
5. More to come...



*A 20-mode Universal Quantum Photonic Processor: Taballione et al., Quantum (2023)*


# Quantum Computing



How to secure access to Quantum Cloud Computer?

© QuiX Quantum

# Secure Quantum Cloud Computing using an Hardware Security Module (HSM)



QuantERA project  
by Kashefi, Kaplan,  
Arapinis, Doosti,  
Zimboras, ...Pinkse

# Summary

Quantum Authentication,  
Communication  
& Secure Computing!

PhD or Postdoc vacancies! **Thanks to**



**AQO**  
ADAPTIVE QUANTUM OPTICS

## References

**Quantum-Secure Authentication & Communication:** Goorden *et al.*, *Optica* 1 (2014); Uppu *et al.*, *QST* (2019); Amitonova *et al.*, *Opt. Expr.* (2020); Škorić *et al.*, *Quant. Inf. Proces.* (2017); Marakis *et al.*, *ArXiv* 2212.12495

**Integrated Quantum Photonics:** Somhorst *et al.*, *Nature Commun.* 2023; Taballione *et al.*, *Quantum* 2023; *Mater. Quant. Tech.* 1, 035002 ('21); *ArXiv* 2110.04380, 2110.05099, 2112.00067



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