



March - Sept 2008



Feb to June 2011



March - Oct 2012



June to Nov 2013




July 2014 - Feb 2015

The ESA Automated Transfer Vehicle

Charlotte Beskow

ATV1-5: 1999-2015: Crew Tasks, Operations Interface,
Deputy MM ATV2, Deputy RPSE for ATV 3 - 5, EST for ATV1-5

The purpose of the Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) was to provide support services to the International Space Station (ISS) during six months following its docking to the Russian Service Module (Zvezda). This led to a complex mission:



The challenges were many....

We needed to get from here

To here





Figure 2-2: General View of the ATV

C. Beskow ATV1-5: 1999-2015: Crew Tasks, Operations Interface, Deputy MM ATV2, EST for ATV1-5

Then from here


To here

and eventually to here



While at the same time ISS had to get from here

to here



S124E009968

The US Shuttle was instrumental in bringing up all the large elements, such as CMGs (Control Momentum Gyros), elements of the Truss, modules such as Destiny and Columbus.. Sheer logistics was one aspect , political support in the participating states another... .. then in Feb 2003 there was a more serious event

FDIR = Failure Detection Isolation and Recovery


The unmanned ATV flew to a manned space station
=> stringent safety requirements

ATV needed to be FT/FS ie Failure Tolerant (FT) and Fail Safe (FS)

This meant that :

after a first failure all functions were still available

after a second failure ATV would be safe with respect to ISS and Ground




ATV Synoptique architecture avionique PA 06/01/2003

The Russian Equipment Interface Control System (RECS): performed multiple functions

- Docking
- Refuelling
- Data connection
- Power connections

In total ATV carried 16 electronic boxes inside the ATV ICC


- Refuelling pyro control
nominal operation < departure
- Docking pyro control
off nominal operation
- Pyro inhibits in attached phase
manual switch



nnn



STR
Side view





ATV 5 experiment
LIDAR experiment
Infrared / visible Camera

Protection o

LIDAR Electronic LIDELN-2 (bracket)
LIDAR sensor LIDOH-2 place (optical head) Kurs

Cameras
Visible
CAMVIS?
STR
Infrared
CAM-IR 2
CAM-IR 1
Missing VDM





Complex mission : multiple types of Cargo and services: **water**
ATV fuel for ISS prop support


dry cargo



gas type 2

Russian fuel
for SM


Gas type 1





ATV Launch campaign activities : Loading Late Cargo at L – 13 working days

ATV is on top of the integrated Ariane 5 launcher
1 day and two shifts were available for this task,
platform was disinfected before and after



ATV-AS-SOR-4000-04 - Rendezvous with ISS
 Issue – Revision A
 - Page 63 -

Chapter 2

Operational scenarios




Figure 2.4-1 : ATV 1st flight scenario synopsis

3.1. ISS SAFETY

The **Approach Initiation (AI)** is defined as the point in the trajectory plan at which the approaching vehicle executes a burn that will cause its resulting dispersed (3-sigma) trajectory to penetrate the Space Station Approach Ellipsoid. S_2 is the approach initiation point.


The safety volumes are:

The approach ellipsoid:

The current dimensions of the Approach Ellipsoid (AE) correspond to an ellipsoid of 4 km x 2 km x 2 km centered at the Space Station center of Mass, with the major axis along the V-bar direction.

The Keep Out Zone:

The keep-out zone is a safety sphere (Keep out sphere KOS) centered on the Space Station center of mass, with a radius of 200 m, which shall be entered only following pre-defined approach corridors.





ViDeoMeter Navigation
 Laser beam sent from ATV, reflectors
 located on ISS RS SM module

Relative GPS : SW in ATV uses data from ATV GPS receiver and
 ISS RS GPS receiver (at least 4 common satellites in view)




Figure 4.8.1 - Closing synopsis

Final approach 250 m -> 20m -> 12 meters
 ISS gently moving, ATV is LVLH <- 20 m ATV follows ISS movements relative attitude nav




Figure 4.14-1 : Forced translation from S₄ to S₄₁

Communication Paths




Figure 2.1-1: General Communication Architecture during ATV flight

Failures were extensively discussed in the operations team. Decisions were captured in the System Operations Reference (SOR) document.

SOR was edited by ESA's Prime contractor based on inputs from

ESA/Industry Flight Segment, ESA/CNES Ground Segment

NASA Flight Operations (Mission Control -Houston)

RSCE designers as well as Flight Operations (Mission Control -Moscow)

NASA Crew office, Astronauts and the European Astronaut Center

For every part of the mission SOR addressed
who did what, when and how

For every part of the mission SOR addressed
what if Then.... Else

In total there were 14 volumes

-  ATV-AS-SOR-4000-01-3A.pdf
-  ATV-E-AS-SOR-4000-02_9A_LEOP.pdf
-  ATV-E-AS-SOR-4000-03_13A_Phasing.pdf
-  ATV-E-AS-SOR-4000-04_14A_RDV.pdf
-  ATV-E-AS-SOR-4000-05_13B_docking.pdf
-  ATV-E-AS-SOR-4000-06_15A_attached.pdf
-  ATV-E-AS-SOR-4000-07_10A_prop_supp.pdf
-  ATV-E-AS-SOR-4000-08_11A_Ref.pdf
-  ATV-E-AS-SOR-4000-09_6B_Dry_Cargo.pdf
-  ATV-E-AS-SOR-4000-10_12A_L_G.pdf
-  ATV-E-AS-SOR-4000-11_10A_Undock.pdf
-  ATV-E-AS-SOR-4000-12_9A_Deorbit.pdf
-  ATV-E-AS-SOR-4000-14_11A_surv_FF.pdf

Many types of failures have to be assessed **HW failure**, **behaviour**, **operator error**

FU	what	phas	S-1/2 - S0	S0-S1	S1-S3	S3	S3-S4	hold	S4	S4-S3	S4-S41	S41	S41-S4	S41-1stc	1stc -S41	esc ape	detection by
GMS	2nd failure ACCA <i>blue = part of JMB CCC case</i>	R&D	A	A	A	H	A	H	H	R	A	H	R	A	R	E	ACCA FU/FDIR. MVM detects double failure and triggers Mayday=> SURVIVAL
GNC	angular rate > 1.2 deg/s	R&D			A	H	A	H	H	R	A	H	R	A	R		GMS FU threshold changes from 1.5 to 1.2 at S1
GMS	angular rate > 4.5 1.6 deg/s	R&D	A	A												E	GMS FU threshold changes from 1.5 to 1.2 at S1
PFS	coarse monitoring angular rate > 4.5 1.6 deg/s	R&D										H	R	A	R		PFS / MSU
PFS	coarse monitoring angular rate > 4.5 1.6 deg/s	R&D	A	A	A	H	A	H	H	R	A						PFS / MSU
ATV	no acquisition of earth pointing attitude	R&D				H		H									ATV CC
ATV	ATV deviates > 9 deg from LVLH	R&D							H		A	H		A			ATV CC
ATV	specified attitude (earth pointing) not held (+/- 45)	R&D					A			R							ATV CC
ATV	specified attitude (yaw steering) not held	R&D				H		H									ATV CC
ATV	specified attitude (yaw steering) not held	R&D	A	A													ATV CC
ATV	Inadvertent triggering of RB CAM	R&D												A	R		Crew
none	CAM test 2 (crew) failed => Crew can not send cmds	R&D		A													crew
CMS	2nd failure	R&D														E	CMS FU / FDIR. MVM detects failure and triggers mayday => SURVIVAL

Bla
Sc

Several layers of monitoring

	S3	S4	S41	ADP	CHOP	1st Contact
range DUA DUP	350 m dp (380 ISS CoM)	40	20	12 10	4	2
range PH DUP		19	11 9	3	1	
MVM (FAS)	FDIR (1st and / or 2 nd failure => ABORT / ESCAPE / RETREAT depending on eqt and failure)					
GMS (FAS)	Sensor monitoring : VDM n / VDM r and TGM n / TGM r => ESCAPE					
	Angular rate > 1.2 deg / s => ESCAPE					
FCM (FAS)	GNC Consistency: difference btw commanded and estimated attitude > 13 deg => ABORT					
	GNC Consistency > 13 deg: Attitude monitoring => ABORT					
	Approach angle (TGM (range + LOS) + attitude) > 7.85 - 6.5 => ESCAPE (reqt is 45 deg)					
				I > 6.5-8 deg I => ESCAPE	Appr angle > 8 - 12.5 deg	Appr angle > ? => ?
	Range rte (TGM + ACCA (x component)) (>profile 0.643-0.121) => ESCAPE	> 0.121=> ESC	Range rate > 0.121 - 0.115 => ESCAPE			Range rate > ? => ?
	Sensor 250 -100m:Th profile 11m - 3.2 m consisten 100m - 40m: Th profile 3.2 m - 1m	Th : 1.0 - 0.63m	Sensor monitoring VDM/TGM range Threshold : 20 - 3m : 0.63 - 0.2		after 3m (2 m PH - DUA) Th = 0.2	
	Transversal CoM velocity wrt LVLH frame (TGM+ ACCA (y and z components) (ranges are DUA DUP)					
	profile 260 - 220m: 0.345 - 0.339 m/s, 220 - 20m 0.099 - 0.07 m/s => ESCAPE			profile 20m - 0m : value > 0.070 (20m) - 0.047 m/s (0m) => ESCAPE		
	Transversal Probe Head position monitoring (ranges are DUA DUP) (TM range/LOS)					
	Th: 40m-18.25m			Th 18.25 m - 0.91m : 1.23 - 0.28 m => ESCAPE		
	Transversal Probe Head velocity monitoring (ranges are DUA DUP)					
FTCP Synchro	MSU monitors FTCP health (SW or critical HW failures(MAYDAY) => FTC health status down at least 10s) => ABORT					
MSU health	MSU monitors it's health (MSU1 monitors MSU2 and vice versa, slave can take over as master) no monitoring after CAM triggering					
Coarse Monitoring (MSU)	Range rate (TGM range) > profile 0.9 - 0.2 => ABORT		Range rate (TGM) > 0.2 m/s => ABORT		(Jan 05: disabled after S41: TBC by EADS)	
	Absolute angular rate (DTG) > 1.5 deg /s => ABORT		(Jan 05: disabled after S41: TBC by EADS)			
	Mean chaser altitude monitoring Zm (ACCA)		(Jan 05: disabled after S41: TBC by EADS)			

Monitoring : ATV CC and Crew : checks and actions

	S3	S4	S41	ADP	CHOP	1st Contact
range DUA DUP		40	20	12 10	4	2
range PH DUP			19	11 9	3	1
ATV CC (range)		< 17 : > 21m RETREAT	range rate > 0.1 m/s => ABORT	< 10 : > 12 ABORT	range rate < 0.05 or > 0.09 ABORT	
ATV CC (passive)	note that ATV CC reacts at 7 deg (HOLD) and 10 deg (ESCAPE)					
	range < 160 ESCAPE	range < 14m		range < 9m ESCAPE		
Crew (GNC & PFS)	Passive angles > 15 deg => REPORT no voice link => ESCAPE		Passive angles > 4 deg => ESCAPE			no action
			Active angles: inner or outer masking of target (ca 5 degrees) => ESCAPE			no action
			Roll angle > 4 degrees => ESCAPE			no action
			Range Rate > 0.15 m/s => ABORT			no action
			Loss ATV TM => RETREAT			no action
			Loss of KURS => RETREAT			no action
			FTC Reset => ABORT			no action
			Loss of MSU capability => ESCAPE			no action

1) Launch on Ariane 5 : a fully loaded ATV weighed 20 tons at departure => AR5 ca 780 tons




ATV CC : Control room layout : Main control Room ATV 2 – ATV 5

NASA / RSCE Mission Director Flight Director Ground Systems



ATV CC : Control room
 layout ATV 2- 5 :
 EST rooms M27 M34

↓ Camera image →



EST Team for ATV4


ESTLs	6
COM	3 (2 on ATV1)
CONFIG	4 (3 on ATV1)
ECLS /WGDS	3 (1 on ATV1)
Crew	4 (6 on ATV1)
DH	2 (3 on ATV1)
DRS	3 + 7 RSCE (2+7) +2/3 ESA in MCC-M
GNC	5 (4 on ATV1)
GMS	4 (same)
RMCA	3 (same)
RFS	1 + RSCE (same) + 2/3 ESA in MCC-M
PRO	4 (same)
PWR	3 (2 on ATV1)
Safety	4 (same)
Thermal	3 (2 on ATV1)

Off site, many
 Contractors : yes

Total EST On / OFF	85
RDV / undock ON site	57
Attached ON site	45


ATV – FAR RENDEZVOUS GPS NAVIGATION

- ❑ Less than 10 m difference among 6 ATV Far Rendezvous trajectories arriving in S3
- ❑ Robustness of GNC illustrated during ATV-4 rendezvous with the loss of a complete propulsion chain due to thruster pressure sensor failure during Homing first boost
- ❑ ATV finished rendezvous on different propulsive configuration




ATV – CLOSE RENDEZVOUS TGM / VDM RANGE DIFFERENCE


- ❑ Range difference of 2-3m above 200m: due to limitation of VDM at this range
- ❑ Below 200m, the range is consistent within less than 1m
- ❑ Below 50m, range is consistent within 0.1m except for small period around 30m



ATV – CLOSE RENDEZVOUS DOCKING ACCURACY



	ATV1-JV	ATV2-JK	ATV3-EA	ATV4-AE	ATV5-GL
Transverse position at contact (mm)	7.7	3.7	2.6	2.2	2.0
Time between first contact and capture (ms)	760 (~17mm)	500 (7-10mm)	400 (<10mm)	Direct Capture	Direct Capture




- Docking accuracy specification is 100mm
- ATV-4 & ATV-5 achieved less than 2mm accuracy with direct capture of the Probe-Head

ATV 1 Demo Day 2 15:04

and 15:09




ATV 1 Demo Day 2 and 16:12




C. Beskow ATV1-5: 1999-2015: Crew Tasks, Operations Interface, Deputy MM ATV2, EST for ATV1-5








eee



Bla bla:

Second level


Heaters ESA Columbus Lab Japanese JEM Lab heaters
Truss
Solar Arrays US part incl Destiny Lab Solar Arrays




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Some final words on the automated docking and the refuelling of the ISS

Crew laptop display showing the docking sequence




The combined refuelling system ATV and ISS



Actual installation on ATV

schematic
for ISS crew

yellow tanks are the He pressurisation tanks (3+3)
green tanks contain fuel (2) and oxidiser (2)



ATV carried 860 kg of Russian propellant to the ISS. The sequence of refuelling was Leak check, Pressurisation , Fuel Transfer and Purging.

ATV CC set up the ATV, Experts in ATV CC and in Moscow monitored the transfer

The actual sequences were pre-programmed and automatic

Relay satellite




Figure 2.5-4 : Simplified scheme of the propellant transfer operations