The Defence and Security Department's Politics and Engineering Working Group analyses current political developments in the defence sector. It provides independent facts and interpretation from the technological knowledge and experience of engineers.

The working group is impressed by the depth and clarity of the Defence Policy Paper 2022. The speed and decisiveness with which this paper has been produced commands respect! In particular, the main line of an innovative, high-tech armed force with great striking power is a prerequisite for winning a future war. Strengthened European cooperation is very important for this, as in other sectors of the economy.
The working group does have some questions about the paper:

Page 8 - Introduction - Increasing clout
1. To what extent is the increased budget actually sufficient to increase the force as indicated in a reasonable timeframe?
2. From when will the armed forces be able to fulfil constitutional key tasks again?
Public analyses give the impression that reinforcement can only start in several years, after the next three years of backlogs have been repaired.

3. How can the DMO realise the increased need for replacement and new weapon systems in time?
With the greatly increased budget, much is possible, but the DMO's capacity and the procedures used are already a major obstacle.

4. To what extent does this paper take into account the development of new threats, such as hypersonic missiles?
Defence against manoeuvring hypersonic missiles is not possible at present. Much research, innovation and development of new technologies is required to make this indeed possible.

5. What contribution is Defence making to deter growing aggression from Russia and China?
Good defences are of great importance, but geopolitically and militarily relevant only when the attack has begun.

Page 22 - Action Line 2 - Personnel
6. What additional measures are being taken to recruit and retain highly skilled technical personnel?
7. What obstacles and constraints does the current shortage cause in the objectives of innovation, acquisition and development of new projects?
Strengthening a technically high-quality, innovative armed forces requires many technically highly trained personnel. There is no mention of this in Action Line 2.

Page 27 - Action line 3 - Strengthening specialisms
8. What expansions of the fleet with manned or unmanned ships are planned?
The size and condition of the Royal Navy's fleet has never been as small and old as it is today, while this Dutch specialism is of utmost importance to maintain free trade flows around the world.

9. What actual means of defence are being developed and/or acquired against ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles, large and small drones?
After all, sensors and command & control systems only provide information.

Page 32 - Action line 4 - More European cooperation
10. To what extent is this Defence Paper in line with the European Union's policy set for 2022?
This includes the Strategic Compass, the Communication on Critical Technologies and the Communication on investment gaps.
Among other things, the Strategic Compass calls for "High-end naval platforms, future air combat systems, space-based capabilities, main battle tanks and more. These should all be next-generation systems full of disruptive and other innovative technologies."

11. Does joint procurement of assets in a bilateral or EU context also lead to joint ownership?

12. In that context, will the Netherlands also become a full member of OCCAR, a European agency set up specifically for the purpose of joint procurement?

Page 35 - Action line 5 - Innovation capacity
13. How does the policy of innovation, the need for advanced systems and the desire for strategic independence relate to the buy-from-the-shelf policy?
After all, the technology of products available and proven on the market is always several years old because development and validation of defence systems often takes 10 years or more.

14. In strengthening the ecosystem with knowledge institutes and companies, how will Defence connect to the economic processes in other sectors?
After all, current procedures and procurement rules significantly hinder that connection.

Page 48 - Annex transition Royal Navy
15. To what extent are the listed unmanned ships being developed, procured and put into service?
In Action Line 3, no unmanned ships are mentioned in enhancing strike power.

16. What is meant by "distributed action" to reduce vulnerability?
This does not seem to be a form of defence, but reducing an adversary's chances of success.

17. To what extent will the good ties between the Royal Navy and the UK be affected by the Brexit?
The working group's impression is that in the medium term, the current UK government's confrontational policy towards the EU will hamper cooperation between EU and UK armed forces.

18. Does the line "Acquisition of Ballistic Missile Defence Interception Capability" on page 61 mean that both the LCF's fire control system will be modified and SM3 missiles will also be acquired?
The text of the paper does not mention this issue further.

Page 57 - Annex 2 "Finance"
19. What explains the difference between the numbers in the table "Growth path of defence spending ..." and the CPB's forecasts?
Among other things, the CPB forecasts a GDP of over 1 trillion (1,000 billion) euros in 2024. The table states that in 2024, Dutch defence spending will be 2.03% of GDP. This should be more than 20 bln, but is only 19.4 bln. The total difference over 2022 - 2026 is more than 5 bln.

Page 58 - Annex 3 "Indicative Outlook Investment Programme"
20. For what reasons is only ⅙ (one sixth) of the investments in the navy being made?
The paper provides no justification, while there has been little or no investment in the Royal Navy (KM) for many years. The fleet was never in history as small and as old as it is today. However, the importance of the KM for free trade flows is growing rapidly. Among other things, due to developments in the Baltic and Black Seas, the South China Sea and the Arctic. In addition, due to the territorial threat of ballistic missiles.

Download a PDF of this commentary here.

_____________________________
The Hague, 21 June 2022
More information on the Politics and Defence Technology Working Group can be found via this link.
Do you have any questions? If so, please contact the working group at E: dv@kivi.nl
Would you like to receive the working group's comments and opinions by email? Sign up via this link.
Disclaimer: The facts and opinions given are based on open sources and on the knowledge and experience of working group members.
This is not an official position of KIVI. The association accepts no liability for anything put forward by the working group or its members.

Photo: Lower House