The "Politics and Defence & Security Engineering" working group analyses current political developments in the defence sector. It provides facts and interpretation from the technological knowledge and experience of engineers.
The working group has the following comments and questions on the European Commission's discussion paper on the future of European Defence of 7 June 2017 and the Cabinet's appreciation of this paper of 16 June 2017. These have been prepared on the basis of publicly available papers and defence technology knowledge and experience. The comments and questions concern technological or related aspects only.
1. General
The working group concurs with the comments of the Federation of European Defence Technology Associations (EDTA,). In addition, you will find specifically Dutch aspects here. This is also a response to the cabinet appreciation.
By far the most important aspect of the discussion paper is the European-wide development and acquisition of equipment. In scenario A, cooperation remains more or less the same as now. In scenarios B and C, there will be a greater role for the European Commission and (new) European institutions. In scenario B mainly coordinating and in scenario C with more decision-making power.
2. Harmonisation of requirements and synchronisation of planning
To make scenario B and C work, it is necessary to harmonise plans for new capacities in terms of content and planning. The Dutch role in this is by definition limited, as 26 or 27 member states play a role in this including the major European countries. Formally, of course, the countries remain entirely sovereign and no transfer of sovereignty takes place, but the explicit need for synchronisation and harmonisation has implications for national decision-making power and options.
In its comments, the EDTA (see annex) suggests setting up a Community Office to study acquisition plans and make recommendations for synchronisation and harmonisation. This also makes sense from the Dutch perspective.
A European harmonisation and synchronisation agency could be in the Dutch interest to create a good balance in Europe. This is an opportunity to create a level playing field for defence. If the Netherlands is explicitly involved in such an agency, it will be possible to keep track of developments in other countries and connection possibilities to them more effectively than is possible in bilateral or regional contexts. It is also an opportunity for the Dutch technology sector and industry to participate more effectively in tenders.
3. Asynchronous capability development and the role of Dutch companies
Large capabilities such as ships and aircraft are traditionally tendered as a whole and executed by large companies as prime contractors (OEMs). There are no such OEMs in the Netherlands, with the exception of Damen/Schelde. However, there are a large number of large and small companies in the Netherlands that provide excellent performance[1] at (sub-)system level. This ranges from Thales Netherlands in the field of radar technology to (for example) VABO composites that makes advanced composite structures for ships.
OEMs in large countries have an involuntary tendency - despite procurement rules - to look for good subsystems not far from home. This reduces the opportunities for Dutch companies if in scenarios B and C there is a consolidation of larger companies. There are, of course, exceptions
An alternative way when building large capacities is to develop (sub)systems modularly and independently of the main system. This form of asynchronous[2] development has been perfected by Denmark in the Iver Huitfeldt class frigates. Individual modules (e.g. complete radar systems and missile launchers) can be replaced in their entirety by new systems or transferred to a new ship. The integrated mast of the Dutch OPVs and Zr.Ms. Karel Doorman was also developed according to this principle. Including this modular development in the harmonisation and synchronisation process offers more opportunities for the Dutch technology sector.
In scenarios B and C, it is recommended to aim for asynchronous development and modular construction. If this concept is included in the European harmonisation and synchronisation process, it offers opportunities for the Dutch technology sector and defence-related industry.
4. Specialisation in European Defence Technology and Industry (EDTIB)
As European institutions, harmonisation and synchronisation become more prominent in Scenarios B and C, the tendency to procure on a larger scale will also increase. Not all companies and knowledge institutes in all member states will survive this competitive battle. Insufficiently competitive Dutch companies and knowledge institutes will struggle in a wider market. However, companies and organisations that are active and competitive in a European technical niche will have more opportunities than now.
It is therefore important to adapt the Defence Industry Strategy to this development and focus (even) more strongly than now on special Dutch technical capabilities. Even if these are not (yet) winners but are in an economically promising technology area.
Dutch policy should also pay special attention to large(er) Dutch companies that can supply complete systems and are technically and commercially competitive in Europe. Examples are KPN (cyber) and Damen (naval vessels).
In addition to technology areas mentioned in the Defence Industry Strategy[3], there are existing technology areas[4] in which the Netherlands is technologically good and can be economically competitive: (1) naval ships, submarines and (sub)systems (radar, batteries, vulnerability reduction and crew reduction), (2) aircraft components, (3) Military vehicles and automotive (sub)systems.
Technology is changing rapidly. New technology areas[5] of great importance for defence in which Dutch institutes and industry can become good at or have already achieved good results: (1) Artificial intelligence, (2) Mission critical ICT, Intel ICT, (3) Nanotechnology, (3) Quantum computing, (4) Neurotechnology (including Brain-machine communication), (5) Directed energy weapons, (6) Sustainable technology.
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The Hague, 17 August 2017
More information can be found on the Politics and Defence & Security Technology Working Group webpage
Do you have any questions? Please contact the working group atE:dv@kivi.nl or T: 071 7113973
Disclaimer: The facts and opinions given are based on open sources and on the knowledge and experience of working group members. This is not an official position of KIVI. The association accepts no liability for anything put forward by the working group or its members.
Photo: Ministry of Defence.
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[1] KIVI, as a professional association, is completely independent of subsidies or advertising revenues. Examples are given solely on technical merit.
[2]"Naval Combat System Development in the Future" page 6; Jan Wind and Paul Rouffaer; CPM Forum Magazine (Germany), November 2004; Marineblad (Netherlands), December 2004
[3] Updated Defence Industry Strategy dated 10 December 2013. This lists: (1) system design and integration, (2) sensors and information processing, (3) advanced materials, (4) simulators and training systems, (5) cyberdefence.
[4] Examples of organisations involved existing technology areas: (1) Naval ships and submarines: Naval Construction Cluster; (sub)systems (radar: Thales, ship-control: RHMarine, batteries: TNO - Delft, vulnerability reduction and crew reduction: DMO, TNO), (2) aircraft components: Stork, Fokker and SME, (3) Automotive: DAF trucks and Brainport region.
[5] Examples of organisations involved new technology areas: (1) Artificial intelligence: UvA, (2) Mission critical systems, intel ICT: JIVC/Defence, Fox-IT, (3) Nanotechnology: o.a.o. MESA+ centre UTwente, TNO-Delft, (3) Quantum computing: TU-Delft, QuTech Delft, (4) Neurotechnology: a.o. BPRC, TNO, (5) Directed energy weapons: TNO, Thales, (6) Sustainable technology: Energy sector.
