The Politics and DV Engineering working group analyses current political developments in the defence sector. It provides independent facts and interpretation from the technological knowledge and experience of engineers.
The Politics and DV engineering working group has the following questions and comments on DMP-A for an Initial Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems capability published by the Secretary of State for Defence on 12 May 2020. The comments have been prepared based on publicly available information and defence technology knowledge and experience.
This Defence requirement statement concerns resources for protection against the growing threat of small drones (up to 20 kg). The working group agrees that the general availability and capabilities of these types of small drones are rapidly increasing. Costs are low and they can be easily deployed by adversaries and terrorists. For espionage and for conventional kinetic attacks, but CBRN attacks are also conceivable.
New technology necessary and short-cycle
Suitable means to protect our units, vital infrastructure, but also our citizens from small drones do not actually exist yet. There have been several stimulus projects in recent years. These SBIR, NTP and CODEMO grants have produced technically interesting concepts but no deployable products. This new needs assessment therefore seems of great importance to the working group.
In this respect, it is strange that on page 2 the "off the shelf" principle is cited again. After all, there are no such systems yet. Buying off the shelf is then not possible and in-house development is necessary.
For effective execution of operations, digital integration of the new systems into the chain of command is very important. A clear information technology policy and a proper technical structure are necessary for this. The A letter mentions integration based on the TEN/Foxtrot standards only as an example, while the purely national GrIT project is being reconsidered by Defence. Furthermore, international cooperation and standardisation are sought. These demands and intentions seem to conflict and hinder interoperability.
Developments in drone combat are moving very fast. Once well-working concepts are developed, further acceleration will not be out of the question. Concepts and products will become obsolete very quickly. Short-cycle development and a relatively very short planned period of use is therefore essential to maintain relevant protective equipment. It is not clear in the DMP-A whether the first equipment to be introduced in 2022 will remain in use on a planned basis until 2035 or beyond.
Innovation partnership
Effective collaboration with knowledge institutes and companies in the golden triangle to bring threat and solution capabilities together is an excellent way to achieve good systems. The Concept Development & Experimentation (CD&E) concept was also invented for this, so to speak. But only if the participating companies also have a reasonable chance of production and delivery at the end of joint development. If contributed and developed knowledge and ideas for a production order are shared with competitors, the risk for participating companies will be too high.
Since 2015, it has been possible to enter into an innovation partnership agreement for this purpose. In February 2019, the state secretary promised to experiment with this instrument from the Procurement Act.
Funding according to the INNOFIN concept
The potential global market for systems, which protect against small drones, is huge. If these are successfully developed by Dutch companies in cooperation with knowledge institutes and purchased nationally, export opportunities are high. This means that private investors will be particularly interested in participating in this technology and products. Especially if Defence plays a risk-mitigating role in this through, among other things, CD&E. This is a typical example of a project, which fits into the concept of innovative financing for technology development. If properly applied, Defence would not have to pay for the investment in the development of these systems.
National security
In a regular tender, candidate suppliers may present themselves that are undesirable from a national security perspective. After all, many governments and companies worldwide are working on these kinds of assets. Knowledge of and access to capabilities of the Dutch armed forces from certain foreign parties may be undesirable.
These developments are of great importance for national security. To best protect it, procurement under TFEU Art. 346 would be possible.
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The Hague, 29 May 2020
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Disclaimer: The facts and opinions given are based on open sources and on the knowledge and experience of working group members.
As part of the professional association KIVI, the working group is independent of political parties, governments and companies.
This is not an official position of KIVI. The association accepts no liability for anything put forward by the working group or its members.
Video: Ardore Photography (CC BY 3.0)
