The Politics and DV Engineering working group analyses current political developments in the defence sector. It provides independent facts and interpretation from the technological knowledge and experience of engineers.
The working group has the observations below on the Report on International Military Cooperation as set out in the parliamentary letter of 29 November 2017. These have been prepared based on publicly available documents and defence technology knowledge and experience. The comments and questions based on them concern exclusively technological or related aspects.
In the letter, the minister reports on the progress of international military cooperation. A subject that for many years has been seen as crucial for the future of our armed forces.
The working group has the following comments and questions on the report. From the working group's background, this concerns only cooperation on the development, acquisition and maintenance of equipment. Personnel and operational cooperation has not been considered by the working group.
1. General
1.1 The report is very broad and describes a wide range of forms of cooperation. In the working group's experience, international defence equipment cooperation is most effective when it builds on concrete operational cooperation. This results in a natural and almost self-evident form of harmonisation of requirements without having to be enforced by force and process.
1.2 A number of bilateral partnerships and general developments in the EU and NATO are mainly reported. Nothing is said about the often-heard plea for regional alliances (e.g. Nordic NATO).
1.3 The bilateral materiel cooperation is only really substantial with Belgium.
Multilaterally, the MRTT project stands out positively.
Air-to-Air Refueling (AAR), Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), Governmental Satellite Communication and cyber defence are mentioned in the EU context, but as far as is known, the Netherlands hardly plays a role in them.
1.4 The coalition agreement states that the government is committed to further continuation of bilateral and European cooperation in the field of joint equipment procurement. However, the report does not discuss at all the consequences this has for procurement policy.
1.5 The extent to which pooling of equipment takes place in a bi-, multilateral, EU and NATO context is not mentioned, while this is of political importance. On the one hand, as a much-mentioned spearhead of cooperation and, on the other, to assess our degree of dependence on equipment from other countries.
1.6 The intention expressed in the coalition agreement to set up joint education and training in a European context is not mentioned. Nor to what extent there is already cooperation with various countries. KIVI contributed to a report 'European defence cooperation on Education, Training and Simulation', published by the Federation of European Defence Technology Associations (EDTA) in cooperation with EuroDéfense in September 2017.
1.7 Cooperation in the field of scientific research is not mentioned, although intensive relations are maintained in that field with Belgium, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the UK, the US, Canada and several other NATO countries.
1.8 Conservation cooperation is not mentioned either. CZSK, for example, cooperates intensively with other countries (GB, DK, GE, US, ...) in the maintenance of radars, sonars, missiles and gas turbines, among others. Common stocks (common pools) of spare parts are also held. This is possible by acquiring the same systems (modules). Thereby, it is not necessary to jointly procure complete weapon systems, such as entire ships: it is about the (sub)systems.
2. United States (page 6)
2.1 According to the report, cooperation with the US, with few exceptions, concerns purchases of equipment through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system.
2.2 However, this excludes the F-35 acquisition, as well as cooperation on the development, production and maintenance of this platform.
2.3 An exception to acquisition through FMS is cooperation in the development of missile defence from maritime platforms in the MTMD forum. However, this very active alliance of 10 countries since 1999 is erroneously characterised as bilateral cooperation with the US.
3. United Kingdom (page 5)
This paragraph mentions the UK's departure from the European Union, the Brexit. The report does not discuss the likely issues in this cross-border cooperation. However, it seems unlikely that the Brexit will pass unnoticed by Defence. Especially in the event of a hard Brexit, it may be important to secure some Dutch (materiel) interests.
4. European Union (page 7)
4.1 The European Commission's European Defence Fund is mentioned in this paragraph. Also the Capability Window. However, it does not discuss the steps Defence has already taken since the announcement early this year to (start) using this fund.
4.2 Regarding intergovernmental cooperation under the very recently signed PESCO notification, it is mentioned that it will be made concrete. The Dutch project focuses on transport barriers. It is important to be aware of the other 46 projects in the PESCO context and the contribution the Netherlands wants to make to them.
5. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (page 9)
The report does not mention the NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS). As far as is known, this is an important and large multinational cooperation programme in which the Netherlands participates. However, it is already more than 10 years behind schedule, while the Netherlands is almost entirely dependent on international cooperation for command and control (systems) for air operations.
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The Hague, 15 December 2017
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Disclaimer: The facts and opinions given are based on open sources and on the knowledge and experience of working group members.
This is not an official position of KIVI. The association accepts no liability for anything put forward by the working group or its members.
Photo: EuroDéfense
