The "Politics and Defence & Security Engineering" working group analyses current political developments in the defence sector. It provides facts and interpretation from the technological knowledge and experience of engineers.
Based on publicly available information, the working group has the following comments on the future vision "Holding on to an uncertain world" published by the Minister of Defence on 14 February 2017. The comments concern technological or related aspects only.
General
There is no price tag attached to the vision document at present. This makes assessment difficult. However, the fine words cannot hide the fact that the prosperous Netherlands, like closest cooperation partners Germany and Belgium, falls far short of the NATO commitments made in 2014!
The document pays much attention to soft power, such as digital and hybrid attacks and other low-intensity conflicts, while globally the threat of larger conflicts higher on the violence spectrum is increasing. A future vision for Defence should also include a clear analysis of the need for hard-power higher in the violence spectrum.
Page 6. The digital information revolution
The observation that big data and internet of things are important for the future is clear. The aforementioned technologies are being busily worked on in the civilian domain. In our view, however, the promises of artificial intelligence and quantum cryptography are certainly no less important. Especially for military purposes.
Page 6. The human-machine relationship
Technological development is indeed moving very fast. The technologies mentioned such as robotics and nanotechnology are mainly being worked on in the civilian domain. However, military applications must also come, or we must make sure we can defend against them. Swarms of autonomously operating drones and bio-terrorism are a serious threat of the future. We must prepare for these technically and materially and not just participate in the aforementioned international debates.
Page 7. Security issues
Here the unsettled geo-political situation and developments are discussed. It also talks about the need to be able to respond quickly when the occasion arises. This need places a claim on Readiness. Whereas in the recent past this has been an, apparently, under-researched issue and the focus has been so clearly on operations, it would be useful for a vision paper to address the question of how Readiness can and should be put and kept in order. Thought should be given to restoring and expanding technical and logistical functions and units in the armed forces.
Page 8. Hybrid warfare
With hybrid threats, it is indeed sometimes difficult to identify opponents. It is important to conduct serious research and development (R&D) on hybrid threats. Detection and recognition of persons (facial recognition), materials (rapid DNA profiling) and communication activities (internet, radio and satellite communication) are important in this regard.
Page 8. The digital domain
The importance of proper defence against attacks in the digital domain has become clear in recent years and needs no further explanation. In the 2015 update of the Defence cyber strategy, Defence policy focused on defending its own systems and networks. In this multi-year perspective, threats outside Defence and specifically vital infrastructure are highlighted. It is unclear whether, as a result of this vision document, Defence will shift its focus to the defence of vital infrastructure and other national interests.
Page 12 International cooperation
Joint acquisition and development of capabilities with NATO and/or EU partners undoubtedly has advantages. Not discussed in this vision paper is the possibility of joint support in the form of maintenance and logistics. There are economies of scale to be gained here and it is recommended that these be explicitly identified and that targeted policy be pursued.
Page 13. European Defence Action Plan
A strong EDTIB and SME access is indeed important. However, many European and national policies hinder this. Among them is the prohibition of the European Investment Bank (EIB) to make their instruments available to defence projects and defence industry. The Federation of European Defence Technology Associations' (EDTA) comments on the action plan address this in detail.
The Dutch input to the European Defence Action Plan also remains stuck in generalities. The effect of the upcoming BREXIT on European defence cooperation is not even mentioned. Yet it can be expected to have effects. Operational cooperation of the Royal Navy and Marine Corps will not change much in the NATO context. Material and scientific research cooperation, however, will.
Page 14. International cooperation
Operational cooperation is beginning to take shape without compromising national sovereignty. Industrial and capability cooperation, however, is still hardly happening. Despite European directives, procurement procedures and the emphasis placed on different aspects vary widely across Europe. It is desirable to harmonise joint procurement systematics for cooperation projects, in consultation with the foreign partner. Especially also in the interpretation used.
Page 22, 23. Strong in the cyber and information domain
Here it is stated that , for reasons of both effectiveness and efficiency, the armed forces should act in a fully information-driven manner using state-of-the-art information and communication tools. Although the terminology is somewhat different, this vision seems to provide few new insights in this area and even to be less concrete than earlier documents such as the "Policy Vision 2007 - Towards a New Balance" from 2005, the Dutch Defence Doctrine from 2005 and in the vision on "Networked Action" from 2006.
It is desirable to evaluate the critical success factors for information-driven action formulated at the time and to adjust the policy to the outcome of this evaluation.
Page 25. Technologically advanced
This paragraph is from the heart of the working group. The importance of technology and the innovativeness of Defence is very high. This is also regularly stated by the Ministry of Defence. However, it should be noted that for some years now, the "buy-from-the-shelf" policy has made innovation and technological renewal virtually impossible.
The observation that the Dutch armed forces distinguish themselves by their innovative capacity is based on years of cooperation in what has been called the "golden triangle" since 2006. The vision of the future should specifically address the (future) role of Dutch industry and knowledge institutes. Among other things, it is important to give direction to the evolution of the "golden ecosystem", as the "golden triangle" is called nowadays. Will there be new national and international players, such as startups, companies from other sectors, engineering associations and the financial sector? How is the role of current players in the triangle changing?
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The Hague, 13 March 2017
More information can be found on the webpage of the Politics and Defence & Security Engineering working group.
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Disclaimer: The facts and opinions given are based on open sources and on the knowledge and experience of working group members. This is not an official position of KIVI. The association accepts no liability for anything put forward by the working group or its members.
Photo: Ministry of Defence.
