The Politics and DV Engineering working group analyses current political developments in the defence sector. It provides independent facts and interpretation from engineers' technological knowledge and experience.
The working group has the following recommendations for the 2018 Defence Paper. These have been prepared based on publicly available documents and defence technology knowledge and experience. The recommendations cover technological or related aspects only.
From the working group's perspective, Defence has lagged behind not only technological developments in the rest of society in recent decades, but also the interaction that has grown in modern society between developers and users of technology, between clients and contractors, and in the deployment of financial resources. Budget cuts, staff reductions and the many reorganisations have unintentionally led to an internally focused orientation at administrative level, while society and also the technology sector have become much more open and interactive.
Defence should be better integrated into society than it is now and thus be able to contribute to the innovative climate and the knowledge economy in the Netherlands. Defence itself has already identified this and is working towards an adaptive armed force. However, this development, in its implementation to date, has mainly focused on personnel.
These and other developments prompt the working group's recommendations below. They can give direction to the desire for new thinking often heard in politics, the Hague bars and elsewhere in the defence sector.
1. Develop and procure equipment interactively with companies and knowledge institutes to regain high-quality and relevant military capabilities
The current buy-from-the-shelf policy and limited budgets for technology and system development mean that the Dutch armed forces are falling further and further behind technologically. After all, new off-the-shelf systems are already obsolete upon purchase. Most other leading countries do direct development of important systems for their armed forces. Through intensive and more effective cooperation with companies and knowledge institutes, Defence could once again have the most advanced systems at its disposal.
Here, it is important that accumulated technological knowledge at knowledge institutes, startups and larger companies is retained and actually converted into usable products suitable for Defence. For Defence, it is important not to stop at experiments and small-scale development, but to achieve broad application of knowledge and products (scale-up). Stimulating knowledge development and startups alone is not enough for this.
2. Fund development and purchase of equipment based on use
Large investments in defence technology and equipment do not always have to be paid for in advance with taxpayers' money. More effective forms of financing are used in all other sectors of the economy. Paying for use is the norm in technology development and deployment. This allows much more efficient use of money. Moreover, it is better for the continuity and stability of the Defence budget. It also makes it possible to reduce the life cycle costs of systems. Intensive cooperation with the financial sector offers additional opportunities to valorise technology in spin-off activities and thus contribute to the knowledge economy.
This concept fits perfectly within existing policies such as the Adaptive Force, the Defence Industry Strategy (DIS) and Innovative Financing (Innofin). However, it needs to be integrated and energetically implemented.
3. Strengthen technical knowledge to make sound policy and equipment decisions
Decisions on acquisition, preservation and disposal of equipment and the personnel required for it cannot be made without sound knowledge and experience. Information from science and technology, from other armed forces and from manufacturers must be gathered, interpreted and evaluated. This lies more at the basis of a good long-term choice than financial and legal information. This requires cross-fertilisation and verification of technicians. Since 2003, the knowledge level at the DMO and operational commands has been reduced to a (much) too low level. The direct risk of this is cost and time overruns on projects. Indirectly, it can result in security risks and, in the longer term, in ineffective weapon systems that need to be brought up to standard at great expense.
4. Connecting the Operational Energy Strategy (OES) to societal and international developments
The current OES contains target dates for 2030 and waiting for technological breakthroughs is one of the main policy principles. After the Paris climate agreement (2015), societal demands regarding sustainability are developing much faster than included in the OES policy. In addition, the major replacement projects now planned have a long lifespan, sometimes until 2065 or beyond. It is unlikely that fossil and other polluting fuels will still be used or even available by then. Especially for these large projects, it is therefore necessary to anticipate future energy developments.
5. Defence against exo-atmospheric ballistic missiles complete
One of NATO's main priorities is the defence of Europe against ballistic missiles. Dutch LCF ships have a unique inherent technological capability to face this threat. With limited efforts, this technical edge can be capitalised on. The military strategic and technological value of this contribution is many times greater than the investment required.
6. Increase the investment ratio to 30% or more
The currently targeted longer-term investment ratio is actually a maximum of 20%. This is seen as the minimum to maintain equipment levels. However, in Germany, as far as we know, the investment ratio has been 30% for years. The 20% maximum in the Netherlands is also too low to catch up with the backlog of the past 20 years.
There is every reason to aim for a higher investment ratio in the future. Fewer staff, more automation, more outsourcing of tasks are changing the balance between equipment and other costs. Rapid obsolescence of ICT and C4I systems also plays a role in this. It is recommended to grow the investment ratio to 30 per cent in this cabinet period.
7. Focus international equipment cooperation on specific countries and stimulate industrial cooperation
Improving industrial cooperation requires positive incentives from governments to industry. Only then will companies focus their business interests on cooperation. Moral appeals to cooperation and forms of coercion do not help. Here, a targeted and selective investment policy is necessary to maintain the Netherlands' technological lead.
It is advisable to focus government cooperation mainly on countries with which there is intensive operational cooperation. With such countries, harmonisation of requirements is much easier to achieve than multilaterally in a NATO or EU context. This may differ from one part of the armed forces to another. Increasing interoperability and operational cooperation and connectedness strengthens the chances of effective cooperation between the member states involved.
8. Finally - timely response to global developments
Technological developments in friendly and potentially hostile armed forces are moving at lightning speed. Weapons that can be developed are also coming, especially in less stable and non-democratic countries. By being faster and smarter, you prevent your opponent (regular or irregular) from deploying its supremacy. In our observation, however, Dutch defence is increasingly lagging behind.
We see rail-guns (China), unmanned ships (US), High Energy Laser (US), ballistic and nuclear weapons (Iran, North Korea), ultra-fast missiles (Russia, China), autonomous weapon systems (Russia, US), cyber (everywhere) and much more. Application of technology is becoming increasingly global, especially in ICT. With these developments, Defence does not connect or has no answer to them.
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The Hague, 19 February 2018
More information on the Politics and Defence Technology working group can be found via this link.
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Disclaimer: The facts and opinions given are based on open sources and on the knowledge and experience of working group members.
As part of the professional association KIVI, the working group is independent of political parties, governments and companies.
This is not an official position of KIVI. The association accepts no liability for anything put forward by the working group or its members.
Photo: Jesterhat84 via wikimedia (CC BY-SA 3.0 EN)
