The Politics and DV Engineering working group analyses current political developments in the defence sector. It provides independent facts and interpretation from engineers' technological knowledge and experience.
The working group has the observations below on the report'It must and can be safer' of 19 January 2018. These have been compiled from publicly available documents and defence technology knowledge and experience. The observations and questions based on them concern technological or related aspects only.
In the report, the Van der Veer Committee provides its findings and recommendations on the Ministry of Defence's mission performance and learning capability in the field of security.
The working group has four comments on the report. These are: (1) integral unconscious competent acting, (2) fragmentation of responsibilities and powers, (3) civilian external standards and procedures, (4) the can-do mentality.
1. General
The report focuses mainly on observations about policies and regulations, with the "why" question being addressed only sporadically: why are policies not implemented adequately, why is more priority not given to filling safety positions, and why is the "can-do" principle invoked to take safety risks. Answering these questions could provide crucial answers for safety improvement.
2. Integral unconscious competent action
Anyone who uses technology must be constantly aware of security risks. Especially when it comes to military technology. Policies, procedures and regulations are instrumental in guiding this awareness, but it is primarily about internalised knowledge of the hazards and risks. Nor is there a policy document in your home telling you not to stick your fingers in a power socket. Yet you don't.
Defence schools and managers at (sub)officer level should educate and train personnel in such a way that they are aware of all possible dangers that they act accordingly, unconsciously.
The working group has the impression that this unconscious action has come under pressure in recent (many) years. This may have been caused by shortages of personnel, education, training and therefore forced improvisation (see report page 10/11). However, this shortage cannot be solved by more policy, centralisation, regulation and control.
3. Fragmentation of responsibilities and powers
The centralisation of all kinds of functionalities implemented over the past 15 years has made responsible commanders dependent on all kinds of supporting "purple" services primarily designed to provide services in (peacekeeping) operations. This also involves other interests than commanders in the field or on board need for their primary task performance. Crucial knowledge is concentrated in these services, at the expense of knowledge and insight among line commanders.
Because these services often work alongside commanders and intervene directly in operations, that commander, as (ultimately) responsible for security, is often not in a position to take this responsibility. The "third line of defence" referred to in the report is not supportive and coaching, but repressive and sometimes has a different objective.
For example, it has happened more than once that a central service carries out maintenance on ICT or communication systems during ongoing operations without consultation.
Centralisation of tasks leads to optimisation in subareas and can sometimes be cost-saving. However, it should not be at the expense of security expertise and competences in the "first line of defence".
4. Civil external standards and procedures
The report mentions a "fourth line of defence" in the introduction: an external inspector, who keeps the organisation as a whole on its toes. This is elaborated in the report only as Conclusions 4. However, there are more possibilities than a single inspector.
In the past, defence technology and its associated security aspects were unique to the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence operated entirely its own rules and security system. In recent decades, more and more technology has been used, which can also be found elsewhere in society. Linked to this are also safety aspects. The fire extinguishing system for OPVs, certification of ships and aircraft are good examples. In the context of the "adaptive armed forces", it might be wise to link up more explicitly with external knowledge and regulations, as are available in shipping and aviation, for instance. Better links could also be made with the knowledge of other NATO and EU armed forces. Defence capabilities could then be more focused on technology and systems that can only be found in Dutch Defence.
5. The "can do" mentality
The report states on page 11 that by appealing to the "can do" mentality, in a number of cases more risks were accepted than were justified from the point of view of working safely with technical systems and munitions. If the organisation's top management exudes that it is acceptable that various aspects of the organisation are not in order (such as staffing, readiness, spare parts), this involuntarily and undoubtedly unintentionally indicates that safety need not be fully in order either. Top brass should lead by example instead of appealing to the "can-do" mentality. In the highly hierarchical defence organisation, responsibility for this should not be placed at the executive level, as the report suggests.
An example is the current deployment of an OPV with defective water-mist fire-extinguishing system in the Caribbean.
The "can do" mentality is a great and necessary asset in a military organisation, but should only be deployed operationally when the risks of inaction outweigh those of acting.
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The Hague, 31 January 2018
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Disclaimer: The facts and opinions given are based on open sources and on the knowledge and experience of working group members.
As part of the professional association KIVI, the working group is independent of political parties, governments and companies.
This is not an official position of KIVI. The association accepts no liability for anything put forward by the working group or its members.
Photo: Ministry of Defence
