The "Politics and Defence & Security Engineering" working group analyses current political developments in the defence sector. It provides independent facts and interpretation from the technological knowledge and experience of engineers.
The working group has the following findings on the OVV report on the mortar accident in Mali. These have been compiled from publicly available documents and defence technology knowledge and experience. The comments and questions concern technological or related aspects only.
Over the past 15 years - since the start of the impoverishment in 2003 - a great deal of (technically substantive) knowledge and expertise, and thus professionalism, has been drained away - due to the continuous cuts in personnel1. In addition, the defence organisation has been highly compartmentalised and centralised to limit mutual informal influence2 and fraud. This is called commercialisation. As a result, many "single points of failure" have emerged throughout the logistics chain.
Of course, procedures must be in place and enforced, but without sufficient expert knowledge, they still fail. Deviating from procedures without knowledge is dangerous. Especially now that commanders have been made heavily dependent on knowledge and authority in all kinds of support services due to impoverishment and centralisation. This development is not unique to Defence, but occurs in many organisations in government and industry. Sometimes successful, but there are always risks that cannot be effectively managed with business procedures.
The implementers do what they can (can-do mentality), but by now have often forgotten the deep-rooted knowledge and skills their predecessors possessed so many years ago. They can do little or nothing about the fact that Defence has partly become a directorial organisation.
The very serious incident described in the OVV report cannot, in the opinion of the working group, be blamed on one minister3. A whole string of cabinets4 has been involved in this gradual reduction of knowledge and skills. As a result, the risk of errors has grown in equal measure throughout the entire chain from requirement definition through acquisition, to use, maintenance and storage. Sometimes such mistakes have consequences at a completely different place in the logistics chain only after 10 years.
The top priority of the next cabinet should be to restore the necessary technical knowledge and skills throughout the organisation and thus bring content-related professionalism back to an adequate level. Furthermore, care must be taken to ensure that knowledge, responsibility and authority in the Defence organisation coincide in such a way that essential procedures regarding suitability of equipment and safety cannot be ignored.
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The Hague, 2 October 2017
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Disclaimer: The facts and opinions given are based on open sources and on the knowledge and experience of working group members.
This is not an official position of KIVI. The association accepts no liability for anything put forward by the working group or its members.
Photo: Ministry of Defence
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Notes:
1 Around 2000, at various defence and knowledge organisations (such as DMO and TNO), active safeguarding of specific knowledge at 3 persons was considered optimal. By 2005, this had already dropped to 2 in various places. Now, this so-called knowledge multiplicity has been reduced to 1 or even 0 in many places.
2 However, structural informal substantive consultation at executive level, for example between requirement formulators, purchasers and specialists, can actually prevent major mistakes.
3 A minister who, incidentally, also does not have long-term deep-rooted substantive knowledge of the complex defence organisation.
4 And ministers supported by, or under pressure from, political parties
