On 31 May, Defence Secretary Christophe van der Maat published reaction to newspaper reports on the incorporation of US strategic weapons and on a price audit of candidate suppliers. On 3 June, the House of Representatives will determine its position on the proposal. Our Politics and Technology working group has two additional questions on this letter.
The Defence and Security Department's Politics and Technology working group analyses current political developments in the defence sector. It provides independent facts and interpretation from the technological knowledge and experience of engineers. The working group has comments and suggested questions on State Secretary Van der Maat's May 31 response to newspaper reports on the incorporation of US strategic weapons and on a price audit of candidate suppliers. The House of Representatives will take a position on these on 3 June 2024.
The answer to the two questions below may give a better understanding of our traffic light questions 5 and 6 on the integration of US cruise missiles (TLAM) and torpedoes (Mk48), as well as a price audit conducted or not. These traffic light questions were: 5. Can the requested US weapon systems be incorporated? and 6. Is the price offered realistic or is this price dumping by the French government?
1. US TLAM cruise missiles and Mk48 torpedoes
The statements in the third paragraph of the above letter make it clear that there is no certainty about the United States' eventual willingness to share knowledge about these weapon systems with the French yard Naval Group.
The experience of the working group shows that the US does not exclude in advance transfer of knowledge on systems like TLAM and Mk48 to friendly nations, if only for diplomatic reasons. Certainly not if it is still uncertain which shipyard in which country will design the ship and must have knowledge about integration. This also applies to NATO partner France.
In addition to what is stated in the letter, in the US, besides the DoD, the Department of State and Congress are also involved in the formal decision on whether or not to licence strategic weapons systems. Within the working group, the experience is that exchange of technically and operationally sensitive information between the US and countries producing competing systems is by no means a foregone conclusion. This applies in particular to France.
The working group is not aware of any example of supply of knowledge about highly advanced US strategic weapons systems to a French party.
It is customary for the US not to communicate a binding outcome prior to the submission of an official request. Military, industrial, political and diplomatic considerations are made only after friendly countries make a request. If the different aspects do not lead to the same position, this can take a very long time.
In short, no real certainty, or confidence, can be derived from de facto non-committal expressions by the US at the procurement stage.
This uncertainty is compounded by the uncertain consequence of the upcoming US elections. It is unlikely that the export licence to France can be granted before those elections.
In addition, French pressure to achieve European Strategic Autonomy in particular will reduce the likelihood of a licence being granted.
As no export licence has been granted at this stage, Naval Group can only give an estimate of the cost for integrating the US systems. Presumably, a contingency is included for that purpose. However, it is difficult for the shipyard to take responsibility for this because necessary information is missing. Since financial information is not public, we cannot give an opinion on the amount of the contingency.
However, our working group is convinced that the integration of these systems is very complex and costly, and unique to Dutch boats.
For the other two submarine suppliers, this uncertainty is much less. The countries where the shipyards requiring the sensitive information are based (tkMS and Damen) already have sensitive information on several US weapon systems integrated into their ship systems. They are also not competitors of the US in this area.
QUESTION 1
For reassurance, does the Secretary of State have any examples of a French shipyard integrating US strategic maritime weapons systems such as TLAM, Mk48, or similar systems in terms of strategic importance.
Such concrete information should be readily available from Naval Group and the French government.
The ministry should also be aware of the outcome of (any) attempts by friendly countries to obtain such an export licence for knowledge transfer to a French yard.
2. Price audit by the National Audit Office (ADR)
Reading the letter, one gets the impression that under the MoU, the ADR will have access to information in the future to carry out audit tasks. The working group believes that a project of this huge financial size, complexity and technical uncertainties requires a thorough price audit before award.
However, our interpretation of the letter may be incorrect.
QUESTION 2
Is the interpretation of the Secretary of State's letter correct that the text is about conducting audits after the final award or placement of the contract?
If so, does this mean that no price audit was conducted by ADR prior to the provisional award?
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The Hague, 2 June 2024
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Illustration: Naval Group
