The Politics and DV Engineering working group analyses current political developments in the defence sector. It provides independent facts and interpretation from the technological knowledge and experience of engineers.
The Politics and DV engineering working group has questions and comments on the implications of the cooperation announced this week by the US, UK and Australia, including on submarines.
On 15 September 2021, the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia announced the important news of an in-depth defence technology cooperation. This cooperation has been announced under the name AUKUS.
The first plan under this cooperation involves the construction for Australia of a series of nuclear submarines for operations in region of the Pacific Ocean near China. This causes a marked change in the geopolitical relations in that region and thus for the entire world
The linked decision by the Australian government to cancel the order of 12 submarines worth an initial €31 billion (the actual cost had since risen to more than €55 billion) at the French shipyard Naval Group, which has been ongoing since 2016, potentially causes a landslide in the role of France, the European Union and NATO cooperation in defence technology.
Significantly for the Netherlands, the French company Naval Group is one of three prospective prime contractors for the submarine replacement programme to supply the four submarines. The technology development for building the submarines for Australia was closely linked to the plans for the Dutch submarines.
We advise the House of Representatives to put the following questions to the Defence Minister:
1. AUKUS cooperation seems to be primarily motivated by China's expansionism. This new cooperation changes the geopolitical situation. Does this affect the operational and technological requirements to be placed on Dutch submarines, and if so, which ones?
2. Cancelling an order of more than €55 billion that has already been in place for five years is a dramatic step. Can the minister investigate for what reason this order was cancelled by the Australian government and make the results of this investigation available to the Chamber before the end of 2021? In doing so, please indicate to what extent these reasons are relevant to the Dutch tender.
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The Hague, 17 September 2021
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Photo: Ministry of Defence
