Building submarines is a highly complex business. After all, everything in the design must be right for the Dutch armed forces' heaviest weapon: small mistakes can quickly be fatal underwater. Our military must therefore have the best equipment for their difficult task in order to contribute as safely as possible to the freedom and security of our country and our allies.

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The current four Walrus-class submarines are nearing the end of their service life. Recognising the strategic importance of our submarines, the government launched preparations for replacement with a DMP-A letter[1] in August 2016[2]. In December 2019, State Secretary of Defence Visser sent a detailed proposal for this replacement to the House of Representatives in her DMP-B letter[3]. The Lower House will decide on it on 18 March next.

Based on the arguments in this article, the Royal Institute of Engineers' (KIVI) "Politics and Defence Engineering" working group believes that the Lower House should decide to tender the four submarines directly to one industrial consortium. The only consortium in which the Netherlands continues to have the combination of features that have made the Dutch submarine service a unique weapon and provides the Netherlands with disproportionate international influence is Saab-Damen. The submarines to be built should be of such quality and size that they can operate without a Forward Operating Base and have enough room for future technical modifications, such as application of underwater robots. That would be good for the Netherlands, for Defence, for the technology sector in the Netherlands, for Dutch shipbuilding, and certainly for the province of Zeeland.

Military-Off-The-Shelf
In 2016, the Minister of Defence identified that many threats, tensions and conflicts in the coming decades will take place on or from the sea. In protecting our security and economic interests, submarines play a prominent role because of their unique characteristics. They are among the most effective weapon systems at sea, the minister wrote, and must be capable of strategic influence, have a large and precise maritime striking power, be able to gather global intelligence and conduct special operations up to the highest level of violence. The current Dutch submarines are in high demand within NATO due to their unique technical capabilities.

This does not include the replacement announced by the minister late last year with a Military-Off-The-Shelf (MOTS) submarine from abroad. The replacement for the Walrus class must be technically and operationally up to the high demands placed on special submarine tasks within NATO. Within the Netherlands, much of the necessary knowledge exists to design, develop and build submarines specifically suited to the special way in which the Netherlands deploys them. That knowledge has been developed by the Royal Netherlands Navy since 1906, together with the knowledge institutes TNO and MARIN and industry in the Dutch Underwater Knowledge Centre (DUKC). Most of its costs have been borne by the Ministry of Defence itself. The Netherlands can use that knowledge when acquiring new boats. Therefore, the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO), supported by the Royal Netherlands Navy Command (CZSK), Dutch knowledge institutes and specialised companies should think along and co-decide in detail on the technical design of the submarines. The government explicitly intercepted the great importance of this in 2015[4].

With the choice of a foreign standard (MOTS) boat as a replacement for the Walrus class, this extremely valuable knowledge, obtained at Dutch taxpayers' expense, will disappear from the Netherlands in a short time and drain away to foreign, often state-supported, shipyards. This weakens the important and unique role Dutch submarines play within NATO and within the EU. Nor does it fit in with the government's Defence Industry Strategy[5], in which precisely the importance of naval construction is a very high priority for the Netherlands.

A or B variant
A submarine is very difficult to detect. Its position or possible presence is unknown to adversaries. Let alone the mission it performs. It is an essential element for submarine missions that the Commander of the Armed Forces (CDS) has absolute control over what a potential opponent does or does not know about the presence of submarines, anywhere in the world. This capability has often been used in the recent past for the benefit of peace and security far beyond our borders. Most other countries do not have this unique capability. To continue these missions, a submarine capable of carrying out its mission over long distances and for considerable periods of time is needed. Safety for the crew is of paramount importance here.

The State Secretary wrote to the House of Representatives in December that the A variant best meets that need. In contrast, for budgetary reasons only, she suggested to the House of Representatives to choose a smaller B variant with limited capacity and range. When deployed at long distances from the Netherlands, this requires a Forward Operating Base (FOB) near the area of operation. Quite apart from the possible limitations to setting up such a FOB on location, a FOB betrays the presence of a submarine.

In addition, a small variant offers less room for the inevitable modifications during the anticipated 30-year life span, such as a variety of submarine robots that will become available in the coming years. A sufficiently large variant, on the other hand, with room for these adaptations, makes the submarines future-proof, and leads to significant savings over the total service life.

If the extra money needed for a sufficiently large variant without FOB and room for modifications is not available now, another way of financing could be a solution. The Lower House has already passed a motion[6] by D66 MP Salima Belhaj on this subject with a large majority.

Race to the bottom
The tendering of a billion-dollar project always generates discussion. Especially in complex projects, there are significant risks of a design process that is difficult to control and the resulting delays and extra costs. This was again in the news this month with Defence's GrIT project, which is now being reconsidered. Australia's acquisition of 12 modern submarines also has similar challenges[7].

New, advanced submarines that need to last more than 30 years are the superlative of complexity. A standard tender with three or four bidders is not suitable for this. Not for nothing do European Defence regulations allow exceptions to the otherwise mandatory European tender. Defence also uses these, but not to a sufficient extent.

With the proposed procurement through competition with a knock-out phase, yards will try to meet all requirements and also be the cheapest in the bidding phase. Consequently, all technical flexibility and budgetary scope disappears from the project in advance. However, construction will always have some setbacks. Costly changes to the contract, delays and disappointing performance are the result. Despite a well-built contract in advance, the bill still ends up falling entirely on the client.

The KIVI working group therefore believes that the contract should be awarded directly to a single provider. It should carry out the project in good and effectively controlled cooperation with specialists from Defence, the knowledge institutes and industry. Over the past five decades, this concept has led to highly successful complex and advanced frigates, patrol vessels and other ships: on time, on budget, and within the specified requirements. And significantly cheaper than comparable foreign projects. Among current candidate bidders, only Saab-Damen can guarantee the same.

An additional aspect is that choosing a consortium with Damen and its shipyard "De Schelde" in Vlissingen also fulfils the government's recent commitment to compensate Zeeland for not moving the marine barracks to Vlissingen.

What to do next
The Royal Institute of Engineers' (KIVI) Political and Defence Engineering Working Group shares the government's and the House of Representatives' view, that the new submarines should be advanced and high-performance weapon systems. They should allow the Netherlands to exert strategic influence globally until 2060. Remaining invisible and adaptive to new technologies are a prerequisite for this.

Only then can the new submarines contribute to the freedom and security of Dutch society and that of our allies in a permanently effective and safe way.

Dutch shipbuilding can design and build such a worthy successor to the Walrus submarine.

Together with the Defence Materiel Organisation, the Royal Netherlands Navy Command, TNO and MARIN, they have an enormous amount of technological and operational knowledge in this field. For more than 100 years. This knowledge unique technological knowledge infrastructure in the Netherlands should not be lost as long as submarines and other naval vessels are needed.

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Previous advice from the Politics and Defence Technology Working Group to the House of Representatives on the replacement of the Walrus class submarines can be found here:

Questions on DMP-B letter dated 6 January 2020

Recommendations on replacement submarine capability dated 13 May 2019

Questions on DMP-A letter dated 8 August 2016

Disclaimer

The facts and opinions given are based on open sources and on the knowledge and experience of working group members. This is not an official position of KIVI. The association accepts no liability for anything put forward by the working group or its members.

[1] DMP is the Defence Materiel Selection Process, in which the House of Representatives is informed about the government's plans in steps A through D.

[2] DMP-A dated 17 June 2016, Parliamentary Paper 34225-13

[3] DMP-B dated 13 December 2019, Parliamentary paper 34225-24

[4] Future of the Dutch Submarine Service, Parliamentary paper 34225-1 dated 9 June 2015

[5] Defence Industry Strategy dated 14 November 2018, Parliamentary paper 31125-92

[6] Parliamentary paper 35300-X-10 dd. 30 October 2019

[7] See among others Reuters WORLD NEWS FEBRUARY 14, 2020 / France, Australia play down tensions over submarine deal

Image: media centre Defence