The debate on the need for armed security guards on board merchant ships plays out around the legal dilemma of government "sword power". In the opinion of the Working Group on Politics and DV Technology, insufficient attention is paid to the possibilities of technical protection measures against pirates.
In his answers of 27 May 2016 to previous Parliamentary questions, the Minister of Security and Justice indicates that the Netherlands is committed to being a frontrunner when it comes to innovation in the maritime field.Unfortunately, the minister does not support research by TNO and the Maritime Security Alliance (MSA) into the effectiveness and coherence of existing technical protection measures.
This is disappointing because by commissioning comparative research, the government can still make a substantial contribution to maritime safety at limited cost. Such research need not be costly. There is ample existing knowledge in this field at TNO and the MSA.
The replies refer to an overview of technical protection measures in the International Maritime Organisation's (IMO) so-called Best Management Practices (BMP). However, the most recent version (no.4) of this BMP was issued in 2011, specifically for piracy near Somalia. Many circumstances and technologies have changed since then.
According to the De Wijckerslooth committee, the government's duty of care is limited. This is explained by the government that shipowners and captains are responsible for technical measures and the government can make VPDs available. However, the two cannot be separated. Technical measures can enhance security and reduce the need and cost of VPDs for the government (Defence) and shipowners.
It is therefore still wise to encourage research into new technical protection measures. Especially if it saves costs for VPDs and increases the safety of ships and crews.
Below is a video on the current possibilities and coherence of technical protection measures.
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The "Politics and Defence & Security Engineering" working group of the Royal Institute of Engineers (KIVI) analyses current political developments in the defence sector. It provides facts and interpretation from the technological knowledge and experience of engineers. The facts and opinions given are based on open sources and on the knowledge and experience of working group members and do not represent an official position of KIVI. The association accepts no liability for anything put forward by the working group or its members.
