But how?

In September 2025, the European Commission announced the creation of a drone wall. This gives the impression that dangerous drones come from outside the Union and must be stopped and destroyed at the border. The idea of using Frontex for this purpose possibly stems from this plan. However, in a hybrid or major conflict, drones can appear from many places. From outside the borders, but also in large quantities from ships, mothership aircraft, trucks driving through Europe and launched locally by friends of the enemy.

This means that the drone wall should take the form of a drone shield. After all, we should be able to defend ourselves against drones anywhere in Europe, regardless of where they take off or land from. These are particularly small drones, but they are no less dangerous. On 16 October 2025, the European plan expanded on this.

However, drones will not only hinder or attack major critical infrastructure such as airports and military bases, but also power stations, businesses, hospitals, local centres and even inhabited areas.

Therefore, the conclusion can be quickly drawn that armed forces will not be able to defend us against this threat everywhere and at all times. They are needed to act at the higher end of the conflict spectrum and cannot stand up to large numbers of drones that can come in swarms from literally anywhere. These technologies, which we see in the last three years in the conflict in Ukraine, continue to develop at tremendous speed. Autonomous and armed drones in swarms will soon be much more common than regular munitions.

By the end of 2025, we will already see this type of hybrid warfare in Europe around airports and military bases. Fortunately, these drones have not yet been deployed as weapons.
Drones from Russia over Poland are shot down without hesitation, but drones over airports and military sites are not. Airports and local authorities have no means to protect their facilities and people.

Yet it is necessary to prepare our country for a much larger number of drones of all shapes and sizes threatening our country.

Defence against drones

The government's policy is for defence against drones over critical infrastructure to be carried out by permanent Defence military drone units. This should be designed differently for three reasons:

  • There is a lot of "critical infrastructure" in the Netherlands. But many more locations can be threatened. So very many units will also be needed to defend them.
    Defence presumably has insufficient capacity to combat drones throughout our country. Certainly not in a crisis with large-scale military deployment.
  • The legal authority for deployment of force against drones lies with the police. To transfer that to Defence in peacetime requires quite a few adjustments to the law.
  • Only in crisis deployment for defence of our territory, anti-drone units can be placed under military authority. However, Defence gets general authority for deployment of force against drones only if our country is actually attacked.

based on the law and the capacity of Defence in a time of crisis or war, it therefore seems wise to focus on the police for the Dutch part of the drone defence.

Deployment of anti-drone systems

To do better, the police should be equipped with resources, personnel and rules to protect their area from relatively simple drones, which, incidentally, can also be lethal. Preferably automatically and, where necessary, possibly with help from defence specialists. This is how it was done during the recent NATO summit.

Unfortunately, because identification of drones is still virtually impossible now, it seems necessary to allow drones on base only with a waiver if the threat increases further. Possibly, this could also be implemented incrementally by first imposing a no-fly zone around critical infrastructure, or only granting exemptions on the basis of a flight plan submitted in advance or to drones that emit an individual recognition signal, similar to the IFF of aircraft.

Unauthorised flying drones may then be brought down by the police.
Defence is legally allowed to do so only on the basis of a request for assistance and then even under the supervision of an investigating officer.

Technological solutions

Initially, sensors for detection and, if possible, identification are needed. Simply detecting and tracking a drone gives more insight into its route of origin and possible threat. For this, a nationwide sensor network is important.
The sensors in this network should detect drones with radar, infrared and possibly other systems. With this, launch sites can be found and the route tracked. The network can be fixed and operated centrally in the Netherlands or from safety regions.
The technology for these systems is widely available, but they do not yet exist specifically for this purpose. They could be developed and produced in the Netherlands with the help of knowledge institutes and companies.
The Counter strike drone Challenge issued by the Ministry of Defence could perhaps contribute to this.

Identifying the type of drone gives more insight. These include surveillance and spy drones, FPV drones and Shahed-format drones. Remotely controlled, operating autonomously and/or in swarms. Route, speed, altitude infrared signal, any images and sound can be a good indication of the type of drone, especially after a database of characteristics has been built up. A target could be deduced from the behaviour and route, although this will always be uncertain.

If there is a risk of drones being armed or used as weapons, destruction should be possible by at least soft-kill, high-energy laser and/or automated firearms. These weapon systems should be developed in such a way that they can be used locally by non-specialists from the police. To guarantee availability throughout the Netherlands, decent numbers are needed.
These systems do not yet exist and could be developed and produced with the help of knowledge institutes and companies. the Counter strike drone Challenge issued by the Ministry of Defence could perhaps contribute to this.

Cooperation in Europe

The concept fits well with the European Commission's plans for the drone wall, which should be ready by the end of 2027.

This drone wall will be a coordinated and layered anti-drone system to protect European airspace and critical infrastructure from threats.
The main goal is to be able to quickly and effectively detect, track and then neutralise drones before they reach sensitive areas or targets.

The project should increase interoperability between member states, allowing them to share real-time information and situational awareness of perceived drone threats.
By creating a robust, jointly developed and deployed capability, the EU aims to build a credible deterrent force against potential aggressors.

The European 'Drone Wall' should integrate innovative technologies including radar systems, jamming (jamming), interceptor drones and AI-driven detection tools to optimise defences against a wide range of drones.

Funding

A nationwide sensor network and a large number of weapons systems yet to be developed requires a lot of money. Although in the Netherlands it should legally be placed with the police, it is at the interface with national defence. The cost of the systems could therefore be charged to the defence budget: it fits both within the 3½ per cent GNP NATO norm for defence and the 1½ per cent NATO norm for infrastructure.

For the systems in the European plan, the EU assumes they will be financed from member states' own budgets.
Budget in the European Defence Fund would be available for development of systems used in more countries. However, it is unclear how that can ever contribute to systems that should be ready for deployment before the end of 2027.

KIVI Defence and Security, 13 November 2025

Illustration: AI generated