The Defence and Security Department's Politics and Engineering Working Group analyses current political developments in the defence sector. It provides independent facts and interpretation from the technological knowledge and experience of engineers.

The working group has the following suggestions for Parliamentary questions and recommendations on the impact of supplying military goods to Ukraine on the readiness and deployability of the armed forces, following the letter from the Minister and State Secretary for Defence dated 31 May 2022 (link) . These have been prepared based on publicly available documents and defence technology knowledge and experience. The comments and questions concern technological or related aspects only.

The working group is well aware of the geopolitical and humanitarian importance of a Dutch contribution to arms supplies to Ukraine. However, these have implications for the readiness and deployability of the armed forces. Our working group already sent a working group opinion on this to the House of Representatives on 26 April 2022 (link) and has noted with interest the House letter of 31 May (link). However, the working group still has a number of questions and comments.

  1. Delivering equipment to Ukraine is done in a situation where, after more than 25 years of austerity, the material state of the armed forces is generally assessed as worrying
  2. The lack of detailed insight into what equipment has been delivered and the impact on the readiness and deployability of the armed forces hampers the working group's ability to provide specific comments. The points below are therefore generic in nature, but no less important for that
  3. Specific replacements and additions are indicated in a confidential annex. It will be difficult to get these delivered quickly so that stocks can be replenished in time. This is all the more of a problem because the stock status of the armed forces was worrisome anyway. It should be borne in mind that not only the Dutch armed forces are going to increase their battle strength and readiness, but allies are also going to do so or are already doing so. Therefore, longer than usual delivery times are to be expected. The working group recommends that the Chamber ask MINDEF & STASDEF in detail, using the overviews in the confidential annex, about expected delivery times resp. deadlines at which readiness at key points (weapon systems, ammunition, components) is brought to an acceptable level, d.i.e. at a level that in h.a. is significantly higher than before 24 February last. Also, MINDEF & STASDEF should indicate what the desired level of readiness is in their eyes, so that the Chamber can adequately perform its monitoring task
  4. In other public documents, Defence has indicated it will use existing framework contracts, call-off orders and US FMS deliveries as much as possible for replenishments. For many systems, however, this will not be possible. For example, when replacing armoured howitzers and other older equipment. For those systems, it seems important to the working group to apply price control methods other than the usual competitive European procurement. Price control based on previous orders, comparison with prices paid by partner countries or possibly "open book" calculations work faster and more effectively than the usual viscous procurement process.
    The working group recommends that the Chamber ask the STASDEF what accelerated procurement procedures are used for replacement and replenishment
  5. On page 3 of the letter, MINDEF & STASDEF write, among other things:
    "However, the equipment delivered to Ukraine will have to be replenished where necessary as soon as possible so that Defence's continuity capability, its ability to sustain deployment in missions and operations for an extended period of time, is not further impaired."
    Worrisome here is the phrase "have to be replenished". This gives the impression that MINDEF & STASDEF do not yet have a plan on how this replenishment will be achieved.
    The working group recommends that the Chamber ask MINDEF & STASDEF for a concrete plan with milestones, numbers and quantities
  6. Also on page 3, MINDEF & STASDEF write:
    "With each delivery, consideration has been given to the stock required to remain exercised and trained, ..."
    It is notable that MINDEF & STASDEF leave unmentioned here the deployability in high severity deployments under the first and second main task. That is ultimately what the armed forces are for. A number of observations are relevant here:
    a. Operational experiences in large-scale conflicts such as currently taking place in Ukraine indicate that the consumption rate of supplies of all categories is many times higher than in the small-scale conflicts with which the armed forces have gained experience over the past 25 years
    1. b. The likelihood of the Netherlands being involved in a conflict with existential dimensions has increased by an order of magnitude (a factor of 10) since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, measured against the assumptions we have taken into account over the past 25 years.
      c. In the May days of 1940, the armed forces fired its entire stock of ammunition in 5 days. After that, it was dependent on daily production from the Hembrug which was insufficient to continue fighting.
      d. At the time of the NATO intervention in Kosovo in the 1990s, KLu had to go and ask allies for munitions (bombs) because the entire stockpile had by now been used up. There are several similar examples in recent national history.

      In short: the Netherlands apparently has a structural problem when it comes to stockpiling and maintaining adequate supplies for large-scale conflicts in which it may become involved. Among other things, this is where the 75-year dependence on US logistical capacity avenges itself.
      The working group recommends asking the STASDEF to what extent the armed forces have sufficient ammunition for gravity operations in the 1st main task. In the past, this was referred to as the war stockpile
  7. Also on page 3, MINDEF & STASDEF write:
    "The current level of readiness and deployment for Main Task 1 and 2 can be maintained in broad terms, ..."
    However, the "current level" is a situation in which neither Main Task 1 nor Main Task 2 can be carried out by the armed forces, as repeatedly stated by observers as well as by various chief and flag officers of the armed forces, including both the current and former CDS. The former defence minister also informed the House of Representatives about this several years ago
  8. Again on page 3, MINDEF & STASDEF write:
    "Therefore, Defence is examining further possibilities to accommodate Ukrainian requests by acquisition or in close cooperation with international partners. The latter has happened with the supply of the Armoured Howitzers, ..."
    This is, in the opinion of the working group, misleading. The Armoured Howitzers were/are being delivered from stored stock. As yet, MINDEF or STASDEF have not indicated how they will replace the pieces delivered to Ukraine. The working group points out that this will not be a matter of placing a simple order with Kraus-Maffei. Does the current deliverable version of the Armoured Howitzer at Kraus-Maffei fit the configuration as known to the armed forces? What will be the delivery time of the replacement systems? How do they fit into the increasingly networked system of the armed forces? What is the impact of the lack, for the time being, of these systems on the expansion of combat power as envisaged in the new Defence Paper?
    In this regard, the working group notes that the armed forces' already unimpressive battle strength cannot be increased, as envisaged by defence planners, but is instead reduced
  9. The section "Finance "on pages 3 and 4 is confusing. On the one hand, it states that:
    "The expenditure incurred by Defence for the deliveries to Ukraine and the missed sales and disposal proceeds will be financed through the defence budget."
    But on the other hand, it also states:
    "The Cabinet has further agreed that additional budget will be made available in the departmental budgets for expenditure directly related to the situation in Ukraine. This concerns additional expenditure that comes on top of regular policy and for which no budget is available in the regular departmental budgets. There is therefore no displacement within the defence budget by the support to Ukraine. Restoring the capability and continuity of Defence in the shortest possible time is of great importance."
    Finally, it reads:
    "Where possible, funding will be sought from the EU's European Peace Facility." With this, the European Commission compensates member states for equipment supplied to Ukraine. It is unclear whether this is in addition to or complementary to the above-mentioned budget allocations.

    The statements seem unclear and possibly contradictory. In general, such ambiguity creates obstacles to practical financial implementation by the HDFC and DMO.
    The working group recommends that the Chamber seek further clarification from MINDEF & STASDEF
  10. Finally, the working group draws attention to the statement:
    "Restoring Defence's battle strength and resilience in the shortest possible time is of great importance."
    This does not imply an obligation, despite the almost existential importance.
    The working group therefore recommends the House to ask MINDEF & STASDEF for a statement with an obligation to achieve results.

Download a PDF here.

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The Hague, 13 June 2022
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Disclaimer: The facts and opinions given are based on open sources and on the knowledge and experience of working group members.
As part of the professional association KIVI, the working group is independent of political parties, governments and companies.
This is not an official position of KIVI. The association accepts no liability for anything put forward by the working group or its members.

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