The Politics and DV Engineering working group analyses current political developments in the defence sector. It provides independent facts and interpretation from the technological knowledge and experience of engineers.
The working group has the observations below on the faulty water mist fire extinguishing system of the Oceangoing Patrol Vessels (OPVs) as indicated in a parliamentary letter dated 26 November 2017. These have been compiled based on publicly available documents and defence technology knowledge and experience. The comments and questions based on them concern technological or related aspects only.
Quality requirements and quality assurance
Needless to say, the observed deficiencies in the watermist fire extinguishing system of the Oceangoing Patrol Vessels (OPV) unfortunately demonstrate once again that safety and quality control at Defence have been under pressure in recent years. The water mist system is an effective successor to halon fire suppression systems for naval vessels. However, the quality of this safety system should be beyond doubt. This concerns the quality of the design, its control on installation and maintenance. Here, responsibilities lie with the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO), the builder, the supplier of the system and the organisation responsible for quality assurance.
What lessons would the Defence Materiel Organisation learn from this incident?
If this leads to (more) external expertise being hired in the future, this fits in with the policy for an adaptive armed forces. However, an important question then is how the necessary knowledge will be secured to make this hiring effective and sensible: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (Who will watch over the custodians themselves?)
Current security
It is excellent that the Defence leadership took immediate action when the security risk became known. While it is dramatic that the ships are not deployable for a long time, it is unclear what considerations at the policy level led to the fourth ship going on a mission to the Caribbean after all. While more firefighting equipment and personnel are going with it, the fire detection and management systems are presumably set up specifically for the water mist system. Not for the loose firefighting equipment that is now going along.
Although the risk of fire is very small, the risk is enormous. A fire on board can have very serious and deadly consequences, as was the case with Hr.Ms Drenthe on 12 November 1980. As far as we know, this was the last major fire on board a naval vessel.
The question is whether there was a proper, and if possible independent, analysis and assessment of whether the chosen emergency solution is sufficiently safe, even for a long ocean crossing.
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The Hague, 5 December 2017
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Disclaimer: The facts and opinions given are based on open sources and on the knowledge and experience of working group members.
As part of the professional association KIVI, the working group is independent of political parties, governments and companies.
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Photo: Ministry of Defence
