The "Politics and Defence & Security Engineering" working group analyses current political developments in the defence sector. It provides facts and interpretation from the technological knowledge and experience of engineers.

Based on publicly available information, the working group has the following observations on the Minister of Defence's answers to parliamentary questions of 8 December 2016 on cooperation with Belgium in the replacement of M-frigates. These questions concern the possible shooter capability against ballistic missiles, which is included in the Belgian strategic vision for these ships.

The Netherlands, Germany and Denmark, and soon Belgium, have the unique capability in Europe to realise a BMD shooter capability. Other large and small European countries do not have this capability. The Netherlands is technically leading the way here. Especially now that the US president wants to place greater responsibility for its own defence on Europe, it makes sense to take this potential niche capability into account when designing the replacement M-frigates. In doing so, the Netherlands and Belgium can make a substantial additional contribution to the NATO alliance's quest for an effective defence against ballistic missiles. .

When developing plans for the replacement of the M-class frigates, it is essential to include the potential for a BMD capability at a very early stage, as was done for the LC-class frigates. This is a fundamental design decision. From a technical point of view, the shooter capability consists at least of a suitable launcher and a radar system, with which SM3 missiles can be controlled.

In the Memorandum of Understanding between the Netherlands and Belgium on the replacement of M-class frigates, it was agreed that the countries would aim for the ships to be identical. The answer to the parliamentary questions mentioned speaks of "virtually identical" and apparently Belgium already assumes a shooter capability and the Netherlands does not. It would be unfortunate if the commitment to identical ships set out in the declaration of intent was abandoned just two months after the signing.

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The Hague, 24 January 2017
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Disclaimer: The facts and opinions given are based on open sources and on the knowledge and experience of working group members. This is not an official position of KIVI. The association accepts no liability for anything put forward by the working group or its members.

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