The coalition agreement shows a serious and welcome ambition to make the Netherlands more resilient in an uncertain geopolitical context. The structural financial anchoring, the focus on innovation and technology, the strengthening of European cooperation show that defence and security are finally getting the priority they deserve. However, this ambitious programme does raise some questions and suggestions for further improvement.
1. Financing (p.31)
"We are also committed to simplifying tendering procedures and participation and offering pre-financing and long-term security, so that Dutch and European defence startups also have a chance to scale up. "
Will the government remove concrete barriers that now prevent pension funds and institutional investors from investing in defence projects?
2. Laws and regulations (P.31)
"We opt for a military that is both deterrent and able to bite through. This calls not only for investment, but above all for a change in mentality: from peace dividend to combat power "
The call for a "change in mentality" does not do justice to the mentality of the vast majority of military, civilian personnel, companies and investors. The mindset almost everywhere is sufficiently focused on obtaining combat power. However, this is hampered by the current system of laws and regulations, which limit, or make impossible, flexibility, risk-taking and mistakes. For a start, the new government needs to start making room for this.
3. Personnel and training (P.31)
"We are building a scalable armed forces of at least 122,000 people. We are scaling up the service year substantially and, as a first step, introducing a compulsory survey for young people. If this does not yield sufficient results, we will consider other steps, such as reintroducing selective compulsory attendance."
3.1. Unfortunately, the limited focus on defence personnel in the agreement does not do justice to the special position of the military and the demands placed on them.
3.2. In care context, continuous learning lines are mentioned. To address the shortage of technical personnel, it is necessary to establish similar continuous learning lines for defence technology. From MBO to university.
This also better anchors the importance of Defence in society, than the current situation, where Defence Technology is taught exclusively within Defence.
4. Strategic capabilities, jointly owned and operated, financed with Eurobonds (P.32)
"We are deepening European defence cooperation. We engage in joint procurement user pools of strategic capabilities that are too costly for individual countries."
If individual countries cannot realise these strategic capabilities, joint development and production is required. Such a form of multilateral cooperation is complex, time-consuming and often fails.
Therefore, these strategic capabilities should be jointly owned and jointly operated. Just like NATO AWACS aircraft since 1958. For financing these, Eurobonds are reasonable as they solve much of the multilateral complexity.
5.European cooperation (P.32)
"We aim to do 40 per cent of our defence procurement and production jointly with European partners. We also aim to procure 50 per cent from Dutch and European entrepreneurs (including licensed production and maintenance). We continue to advocate the opening up of closed national defence markets in Europe. "
The 50 per cent target is inconsistent with the aim of independence from purchases from outside NATO and reduced dependence on non-European NATO countries. For consistency, the target percentage should be well above 50%.
6. Vital Infrastructure and Protection (P.32)
"In addition to protecting our own and allied territory, we are strengthening the protection of our vital infrastructure in the North Sea and the defence of the Caribbean part of the Kingdom." p. 32
6.1 The agreement highlights hybrid threats, sabotage and drone incidents around vital infrastructure. This emphasises that water infrastructure should also be explicitly included in national security policy. How does the government embed structural cooperation between the Ministry of Defence, water boards, Rijkswaterstaat and security regions as an integral part of national security?
6.2 Will the police and/or defence be given explicit powers and resources for active intervention in the event of sabotage of national vital infrastructure, defence against large numbers of drones, etc.? Or will it remain limited to monitoring?
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The Hague, 1 February 2026
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Photo: JW
