On 15 March, Defence Secretary Christophe van der Maat announced the caretaker government's provisional choice of submarines from the French company Naval Group. On 3 June, the House of Representatives will determine its position on this proposal. Our Politics and Technology working group has six "traffic light" questions on this preliminary choice.
The Defence and Security Department's Politics and Technology working group analyses current political developments in the defence sector. It provides independent facts and interpretation from engineers' technological knowledge and experience. The working group has comments and suggested questions on the DMP-D for the replacement of the Walrus-class submarines, on which the House of Representatives will take a position on 3 June 2024.
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As indicated on 22 March 2024 (link), our working group notes that the selection process followed so far has been the "Race to the bottom (link)" we warned about in 2020. Based on our knowledge and experience, we expect that our other predictions given at that time will also come true.
We state this not from an interest in any of the parties, but through an objective consideration of technological aspects, the procedure followed and its outcome based on the knowledge and experience of our members.
By analogy with the State Secretary, the working group suggests the following "traffic light questions" for the Lower House's consideration of the provisional award decision. Only if all 6 of these are on "green" is the proposed decision appropriate.
1. Does the proposed decision fit the current geopolitical situation?
The 2016 DMP-A and 2020 DMP-B on which the tender is based assumed long-term peace and a shrinking armed forces. Shouldn't developments since then affect numbers of submarines and a larger, more differentiated newbuilding capacity for submarines in Europe?
Do the technical and deployment constraints of a "modified off-the-shelf standard design" fit the larger and more flexible needs of today? In the working group's view, more flexibility and growth capacity is needed now. Indeed, the needs assessment on which the proposed decision is based has not been updated since 2016.
2. Does the proposal fit with the government policy approved by parliament?
The Defence Industry Strategy (DIS), the Strategic Agenda for the Maritime Manufacturing Industry (SaMMI), the Northern Naval Capability Cooperation (NNCC), the Open Strategic Autonomy Policy (OSA), etc. all indicate that it is precisely this specific knowledge and associated companies that is also used for submarines that should be retained.
Now that this is on the table for a strategically very important project, the government is deviating from it.
3. Are the risks of a contract to Naval Group sufficiently covered?
Contracts from other countries to Naval Group structurally lead to large cost increases and delays. These contracts with a very large financial volume are undoubtedly (also) very carefully drawn up and provided with the necessary legal securities.
Best known recent example is the Australian submarines of the same type that had doubled in price after 2 years. In addition, the involvement of local industry was also far from completed as agreed. Many other countries have a similar experience.
In early May 2024, another delay in the delivery of the Belgian/Dutch minehunters and the associated "toolkit" was also announced by Naval Group.
These are not only short(er) term risks in the initial procurement, but also large cost overruns during further development, construction and later during maintenance.
The ADR warns in its report that the risks, risk mitigation and their consequences have not been made sufficiently clear by Defence. Especially with the Australian and other experiences with Naval Group, this seems especially important.
4. Are the knowledge and deployment doctrines built up over 120 years in the Netherlands safeguarded?
Although the scope and content of the industrial participation is still unclear, the list of the 10 participating companies shows that this is mainly focused on platform technology. Only one company is working on one of the many sensors.
The knowledge of weapon systems and weapon system integration in which the Netherlands excels, with TNO, JIVC and the Submarine Service, among others, is therefore not used. That is what Dutch doctrines and military deployments are geared to. Now that it is no longer deployed, that knowledge will disappear in the coming years, because it does not match French technology.
Moreover, the weapon system technology in Naval Group's systems will no doubt be shielded from the user on grounds of property rights and French national security. So new knowledge will not be built. No insight, only user manual.
5. Can the required US weapon systems be fitted?
US Mk48 torpedoes have been in use by the submarine service for many years. All deployment and maintenance systems are tailored to that. The US Tomahawk cruise weapons are now being added for the Walrus class. Integration of these weapons into a submarine of the French Naval Group is very complex, unique to the Netherlands and probably technically impossible.
In addition, the US may not grant an export licence for the required knowledge to France. If it does, it is unlikely that the integration can be carried out within time and budget.
6. Is the price offered realistic or is this price dumping by the French government?
The price for the Australian Barracuda Shortfin (4500 tonnes, 97m long, 8.8m diameter) went up from €2.8bn to €4.7bn per boat even before construction started. The equally complex, but slightly smaller Barracuda Blacksword for the Netherlands is now being offered for around €1.25 to €1.5 bln per boat.
The Netherlands and Indonesia will pay roughly the same price, but Indonesia will get the smaller and simpler Scorpène.
The Dutch version will then also have to integrate the US Mk48 torpedo and Tomahawk cruise missile and the Norwegian Naval Strike Missile.
This reinforces indications that the French government aims to monopolise the Defence market and supports industry in bidding below cost to win foreign orders.
After the contract is awarded, a new situation arises. As a result, the final cost of the project cannot be quantified.
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The Hague, 17 May 2024
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Disclaimer: The facts and opinions given are based on open sources and on the knowledge and experience of working group members.
This is not an official position of KIVI. The association accepts no liability for anything put forward by the working group or its members.
Illustration: Naval Group
